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12
Social Science and the Evolving
Standards of Death Penalty Law
Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Samuel R. Gross

Introduction
Unlike many of the topics covered in this book, death penalty litigation involves a wide variety of empirical issues. The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." But what is a "cruel and unusual punishment?" It
could be a punishment that is morally unacceptable to the American
people, like cutting off noses or hands. Following the other clauses of
the amendment, it could be a punishment that is excessive, in that a
lesser penalty would achieve the same ends. For example, if a death
sentence served no penological purpose that was not served just as well
by life imprisonment, the death penalty might be seen as excessive. Or
the death penalty could be cruel and unusual in practice if it is rarely
imposed and if the decision to take or spare the criminal's life is
unprincipled. We would like to believe that the people who are executed are those who have committed the most monstrous crimes. If
instead there is no rational means of differentiating the few who are
sentenced to die from other killers, except perhaps for impermissible
criteria like race or poverty, that could be cruel and unusual. All of
these definitions have been proposed, and each has produced various
lines of empirical research that have played a role in death penalty
litigation.
The constitutionality of the death penalty, and of the procedures
that are used to impose it, are questions of law. Although much of
the research involves juries and the public at large, on these issues the
ultimate fact finders and evaluators of the research are judges, usually
Supreme Court justices, and it is their "common knowledge" and their
ability to evaluate the research that matters. The evidence comes to
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them summarized in briefs written by the parties or by "friends of the
court" - amici curiae. These amici may include professional organizations such as the American Psychological Association, or ad hoc groups
of social scientists. The justices may evaluate the quality of the research,
but initially they also decide whether the research is even relevant to
the constitutional question before them, as they understand it.
It would be impossible in a chapter of this length to provide a
detailed description of all the varieties of empirical research related to
the death penalty, the ways in which they have been presented to the
courts, and the courts' responses to them. Instead, this chapter provides a general framework for classifying and understanding the kinds
of empirical questions that have been raised and their constitutional
implications, the kinds of data that have been presented to the courts,
and the courts' response.
It is important to remember that public policy on the death penalty
does not just involve knowledge; it also involves values. Over the last
40 years capital punishment has been an emotionally charged issue in
the United States, central to people's ideological self-image (Ellsworth
& Ross, 1983; Ellsworth & Gross, 1994; Gross, 1998). Most of the
important cases on capital punishment were decided during this period,
and all of the cases that involved empirical research. The values of the
Supreme Court - like those of the public at large - were decidedly
pro-death penalty. As a result their evaluations of the evidence may
have been less objective than their evaluation of social science evidence
on less emotionally charged topics.

Public Acceptance of Capital Punishment:
"Evolving Standards of Decency"
The most direct definition of a cruel and unusual punishment is a
punishment that is uncommon and morally unacceptable to the public.
No one, not even the strict constructionists on the Court, believes
that all of the punishments commonly used in the late eighteenth
century, when the Constitution was drafted, would be acceptable
under the Eighth Amendment today. Mutilation and flogging were
abandoned long ago. Instead, the Supreme Court has held that the
Eighth Amendment "draws its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" ( Trop v.
Dulles, 1958 ). The implication is that there is a trend toward a penal
system that is more enlightened and humane, and that some punishments that once seemed normal may eventually come to be seen as
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barbarous. The empirical questions are whether such a trend exists and
whether we have evolved to a point where the death penalty is no
longer tolerable in our society.
In Europe, this trend is clear. Since the Second World War every
European country has abolished capital punishment. By the turn of
the twenty-first century the policy of the European Union was that
"there is no case where capital punishment can be justified under the
international human rights standard" (Zimring, 2003, p. 27), and no
nation that retained the death penalty was permitted to be a member.
The European governments' standards of decency seem to have evolved
more rapidly than those of their citizens. In most European countries
the death penalty was abolished despite public support, and it was only
later that popular opinion fell in line with official policy.
In the United States the primary responsibility for criminal justice
rests with the states. Neither Congress nor the president has any
obvious authority to abolish the death penalty at the state level. The
Supreme Court could do so, however, because the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide "due process of law" in all criminal
cases, and due process has been interpreted to include the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In considering whether executions violate that prohibition, the Supreme Court
has looked to the ethical standards of contemporary society.
Public support for the death penalty in the United States fell steadily
from the early 1950s until the mid-1960s, when opponents were at
least as numerous as proponents. The number of executions also
declined during this period, from over 100 in 1951 to nearly zero in
the mid- to late 1960s, followed by a judicial moratorium on executions that lasted from 1967 until 1976. In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,
the Supreme Court held that all death penalty laws, as administered
at the time, were unconstitutional. But the Court left open the possibility that a fairer, less arbitrary system of capital punishment might
pass constitutional muster. In 1966 public support for the death
penalty reached its lowest point, with only 47% of Americans favoring
it (Ellsworth & Gross, 1994); after that, the trend reversed, and
support for the death penalty increased sharply between 1966 and
1982, and moderately between 1982 and the mid-1990s, when one
poll ( Gallup, 1994) found that 80% of Americans favored the death
penalty. Since then, support has declined to around 65% in 2005. By
1976, when the Supreme Court reconsidered the constitutionality of
the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, support for the death penalty
had already risen to 66% (NORC, 1976 ), and the Court concluded
that "a large proportion of American society continues to regard death
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as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction" ( Gregg v. Georgia,
1976, p. 878), and thus that capital punishment was not cruel and
unusual by contemporary standards.
In general, the Supreme Court's opinions have tracked the empirical
data on public opinion towards the death penalty fairly well. The death
penalty was abolished not long after public support reached an all-time
low, and was reinstated following the dramatic increase in support
through the mid-1970's (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). This is not to say
that the Court analyzed the public opinion poll data carefully, or that
the justices actually based their decisions on the empirical research.
Their "empirical evidence" was broader and less systematic. Occasionally the opinions refer to a public opinion poll or a scholarly article,
but they rely more heavily on state referenda, new legislation, and
patterns of jury verdicts. On the whole, the Court has been right about
where America stands in the progress of a maturing society.
This is not surprising. The results of public opinion polls on the
death penalty are widely publicized, easy to understand, obviously
related to the constitutional question at issue, and rarely disputed.
Death penalty attitudes are relatively immune to the kinds of changes
in question wording and order that raise doubts about the validity of
surveys on some other topics (Schuman & Presser, 1981; Schwarz,
Groves, & Schuman, 1998; Ellsworth & Gross, I 994; Gross &
Ellsworth, 2003). There is quite a bit of research on death penalty
attitudes that is more complex than the simple favor-oppose polls,
research exploring the bases of people's attitudes, regional and demographic differences, and the reasons for attitude change. Few Justices
have paid attention to this more nuanced research, but it is not clear
that there is any reason that they should. All of the polls since the
death penalty was reinstated show that a majority of Americans favor
it. After 1995 this majority fell to 65%. It hovers around 50%, if
respondents are explicitly given the choice between death and life in
prison without parole, but it has not yet fallen to a level that could
plausibly be called public rejection, and the Court has not considered
the possibility of abolishing the death penalty since 1976.
The Court has attended to differences in public support of the death
penalty for different kinds of capital defendant. Just a year after the
death penalty was reinstated in Gregg, the Court held that the penalty
of death was disproportionate and excessive for rapists, and therefore
unconstitutional, and justified their decision with evidence that the
public no longer felt that the death penalty was appropriate for the
crime ofrape ( Coker v. Georgia, 1977). (The Court mostly cited legislative decisions and jury verdicts, rather than opinion polls, and

12 Evolving Standards of Death Penalty Law 241
completely ignored the powerful empirical evidence of racial bias in
executions for rape.)
In the late 1990s, after a 15-year plateau of general enthusiasm for
the death penalty, support dropped significantly, from 75% or higher
to about 65% (Gross & Ellsworth, 2003; Death Penalty Information
Center). Correspondingly, after a short lag, the Supreme Court has
begun to restrict the use of the death penalty. In two recent cases, the
Court relied heavily on changes in public attitudes. In Atkins v. Virginia (2002) the Court held that the execution of people who are
mentally retarded is unconstitutional, relying primarily on the fact that
a majority of state legislatures had outlawed the practice; but also
citing briefs by the APA and other professional organizations, as well
as national opinion polls, to reach the conclusion that the "legislative
judgment reflects a much broader social and professional consensus"
(Atkins v. Virginia, 2002, FN 21 ). This is an accurate reflection of
the research on public opinion. Even when levels of overall support
were at their highest, only about 25% of the population favored the
death penalty for mentally retarded killers. For example in 1988, when
71 %of the population favored execution of murderers and 51 %favored
the execution of rapists, only 21 % favored the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants (Gross & Ellsworth, 2003). By 2002 support
was down to 13% (Gallup, 2002).
In the second case, Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Court held that
it was unconstitutional to execute people for crimes they committed
before the age of 18. The opinion closely follows the holding in
Atkins, using evolving standards of decency as the rationale, and
relying primarily on state legislative changes for evidence, although
the movement to abolish capital punishment for defendants under 18
was more sluggish than it was for mentally retarded defendants. The
Court used social science data not for the proposition that the public
has come to repudiate the execution of juveniles, but for evidence that
the juvenile mind is not the same as the adult mind: It is less aware
ofresponsibility, less able to resist peer pressure, and more susceptible
to further development. The Court also emphasized the rejection of
the death penalty for juveniles by every other nation in the world
(except Somalia, which had no functioning government.)
On the surface, the Roper opinion looks like the Atkins opinion
bolstered by two additional lines of supporting evidence. A cynic
might conclude that these two new lines of evidence were trotted out
because the core argument - that the American public rejects the death
penalty for young offenders - is somewhat weaker than the parallel
argument in Atkins. The legislative evidence is less compelling, and
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public opinion surveys - which the Court does not mention in Roper
- are less overwhelmingly one sided. In 1989, when the Court held
in Stanford v. Kentucky that the execution of 16- and 17-year-olds was
acceptable to Americans, 5 7% of the public favored that position
(Time\CNN\Yankelovich, 1989). In 1994 61% favored it (Gallup,
1994). By 2001, with overall support for the death penalty declining,
support for juvenile executions dropped to about 36% (NORC, 2001
[34%]; Princeton Survey Research Associates, 2001 [38%]), and
remained at that level (Princeton Survey Research Associates, 2003
[35%], and 2005 [37%]). Still, while rejection of the death penalty for
juvenile defendants is more recent and less overwhelming than for
retarded defendants, the Court's decision accurately tracks changes in
public opinion.

Excessiveness of Capital Punishment: The Question
of Deterrence
The argument that the death penalty is excessive has two prongs. The
simpler one is that it is grossly disproportionate to the crime for which
it was imposed. This was the specific legal ground the Court relied on
in Coker v. Georgia (1977) to outlaw the death penalty for rape. Evidence of public rejection of death as a punishment fix rape ( and other
nonhomicidal crimes) was used to support the claim that the death
penalty was excessive because it was categorically disproportionate to
the crime. The Court has never entertained the argument that death
is a disproportionate punishment for murder. But it did consider a
second type of excessiveness in murder cases: that the death penalty is
excessive because it serves no legitimate purpose that is not equally
well served by life imprisonment. In Furman ( 1972) some of the justices in the majority took the position that death sentences as rare and
unpredictable as the ones before the Court served no useful retributive
purpose. The main question, however, was the marginal deterrence of
capital punishment: Do executions deter homicide more effectively
than imprisonment for life?
When Furman was decided the main source of systematic evidence
on the deterrent effect of the death penalty was the seminal work of
Thorsten Sellin (1967). Sellin conducted a series of comparisons of
homicide rates in the United States between 1920 and 1955: Between
states that had the death penalty and neighboring states that did not;
within states that had had the death penalty and abolished it, and then
sometimes restored it; and between states that abolished or restored
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the death penalty and neighboring states that did not. None of these
comparisons indicated that the death penalty lowered the homicide
rate. Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion in Furman, discussed
this evidence in detail in support of his position that the death penalty
is inherently unconstitutional.
In Gregg in 1976 the Court was presented with a new study, by
Isaac Ehrlich, that analyzed the relationship between executions and
homicide rates in the United States as a whole, by year, from 1933
through 1969. Using econometric models and multiple regression
analyses, Ehrlich claimed to find that each execution reduced the
homicide rate to the extent of saving eight lives ( 1975 ). By the time
Gregg got to the Court, Ehrlich's study had been subjected to extensive and withering criticism (see Blumstein, Cohen & Nagen, 1978;
Dike, 1982; Lempert, 1981, for reviews). Among other problems,
critics pointed out that he had not controlled for the severity of the
alternative, noncapital sanctions for murder; and that the effect he
found disappears entirely if the years from 1965 through 1969 are
removed from the analysis - a period in which a very low rate of executions coincided with the beginning of a long-term rise in homicide
rates. The plurality of the Court in the decisive opinion in Gregg did
not attempt to address any of these methodological questions. Instead,
it wrote the issue of deterrence out of the legal debate over the constitutionality of capital punishment. It noted that there were conflicting studies - which was literally true, ignoring the value of those
studies - and concluded that "there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting" the claim that the death penalty
is a unique deterrent, and that this is "a complex factual issue the
resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures" ( Gregg, 1976,
p. 186 ).
Having kicked the issue over to legislatures, the Supreme Court
has never revisited the question of deterrence. Nor is it likely to. In
Furman there was an active debate over the appropriateness of retribution as a justification for capital punishment (or punishment in
general). For example, Justice Powell, writing for the four pro-death
penalty dissenters, quoted an earlier Supreme Court statement that
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law"
and explained: "It is clear, however, that the Court did not reject
retribution altogether" (Furman, 1972, p. 452). In Gregg, four years
later, the Court explicitly upheld retribution as a justification for the
death penalty because a legislature could legitimately conclude "that
certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity
that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death" ( Gregg,
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1976, p. 184). So deterrence is no longer a necessary argument for
the punishment. The Court's position here tracks public opinion.
In the past forty years retribution has become accepted and popular
in the United States as justification for punishment in general (Ellsworth & Gross, 1994), and it has overtaken deterrence and become
the dominant reason people give for supporting for the death penalty.
At the same time, a strong majority of the public has come to believe
that the death penalty does not deter homicide better than life imprisonment (Gross & Ellsworth, 2003).
Academic debate over the deterrent effect of capital punishment
continued after Gregg. In 1978 the National Academy issued a report
reviewing the evidence in support of a deterrent effect of capital punishment - basically, the Ehrlich study - and found it unpersuasive
(Blumstein et al., 1978). In the 20 years that followed there were
periodic new studies on the issue, most of which found no deterrent
effect (Bailey, 1998; Sorenson, Wrinkle, Brewer, & Marquart, 1999).
In the past several years there has been a spate of new econometric
studies of deterrence and the death penalty, most of which claim to
find a deterrent effect, but not all. As with Ehrlich's, these studies have
been reviewed and heavily criticized. Independent researchers have
demonstrated that the findings of deterrence are unstable and depend
on arbitrary methodological choices (Berk, 2005; Donohue and
Wolfers, 2006), and have concluded that, as the National Academy
found 28 years earlier, "We can be sure that the death penalty does
not cause or eliminate large numbers of homicides, but we learn little
else from the data" (Donohue & Wolfers, 2006, p. 844). The new
claims of a deterrent effect - whatever their worth - are not likely to
figure directly in court decisions one way or the other, but might be
used in policy debates to bolster support for capital punishment now
that it is in decline.

Arbitrariness and Discrimination: Capital
Punishment in Practice
In 1972, when the Supreme Court held that the death penalty as then
administered was unconstitutional (Furman v. Georgia, 1972), neither
deterrence nor contemporary standards figured importantly in the
decision. Furman is a particularly difficult case to interpret, because it
was a 5 to 4 decision in which each Justice wrote a separate opinion.
Brennan and Marshall, the two Justices who were categorically opposed
to capital punishment, discussed both of these issues, but the only
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issue that was common to the five majority Justices was that the death
penalty statutes of the time resulted in decisions that were at best
arbitrary, and possibly discriminatory against racial minorities, particularly African Americans. Those who were executed were not the ones
who had committed the most awful murders, but a haphazard, unlucky
selection - "like being struck by lightning" in the words of Justice
Stewart (Furman, 1972, p. 309) - or, worse, a systematic selection
of people without money, friends, or white skin. As Justice Douglas
put it, "one searches our chronicles in vain for the execution of
any member of the affluent strata of this society" (Furman, 1972,
pp. 251-252).

Jury instructions
At the time of the Furman decision, capital juries were typically given
no instructions at all on how to decide who should be executed and
who should not. They were simply sent into the jury room and told
to decide whether the defendant was guilty, and, if so, whether the
penalty should be life or death.
By the time the Furman decision was handed down, public support
for the death penalty was on the rise. Most states responded quickly
and enacted new death penalty statutes designed to ensure that the
unfettered jury discretion of the past would be suitably directed so
that death sentences would be calibrated to the seriousness of the
crime. In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia and its companion cases, the
Supreme Court declared that the death penalty was constitutional if
states provided a bifurcated trial, in which the penalty was decided in
a separate proceeding after guilt had been decided; there were specific
instructions limiting the aggravating factors that could be considered
in deciding for the death penalty, and requiring that the jury balance
these against any mitigating factors. The idea was that these "guided
discretion" statutes would eliminate the arbitrariness and possible discrimination that had existed in the pre- Furman days. As the plurality
opinion stated, "No longer can a jury wantonly or freakishly impose
the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines" ( Gregg, 1976, pp. 206-207).
If the Court had hoped to settle the issue once and for all in Gregg,
it certainly failed. Since then, capital cases have been a constant item
on the Court's agenda, and there is no sign that the number of cases
is diminishing. Most of these cases have concerned the administration
of the death penalty and the effectiveness of the post-Gregg laws in
eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination.
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This is not surprising. Decisions about the appropriate penalty particularly when the choice is life or death - inevitably implicate
values and moral principles more deeply than decisions about guilt or
innocence. In most states the list of aggravating factors that the jury
is supposed to consider include vague value-laden considerations such as whether the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and
cruel - and sometimes considerations that invite race or class bias,
such as whether the defendant would be dangerous or a threat to
society in the future. One of the fundamental arguments for trial by
jury is that the jury represents the "conscience of the community,"
the values of the public, rather than the views of the government or
an elite ruling class. Efforts to circumscribe community morality by
formulaic rules may be incompatible not only with the purpose of the
jury but with human psychology itself. In addition to the motivational
and emotional difficulties of deciding good and evil according to a
prescribed recipe, the cognitive challenge is substantial. Most researchers agree that jurors have a very hard time understanding legal instructions in general (Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000; Lieberman & Sales,
1997), and the instructions that they are given at the penalty phase
of a capital trial are especially difficult (Diamond & Levi, 1996;
Eisenberg & Wells, 1993; Haney & Lynch, 1994, 1997). Even before
Furman, in McGautha v. California ( 1971) Justice Harlan foresaw
this dilemma: "To identify before the fact those characteristics of
criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be
fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to
be tasks which are beyond present human ability" (McGautha, 1971,
p. 204). The Court in Furman ignored this dire warning, and proceeded on the assumption that legislatures could somehow square the
circle. Psychological research, unfortunately, seems to have confirmed
Justice Harlan's pessimistic assessment. It has certainly shown that
efforts to date have not been successful.
The guidelines that jurors are supposed to apply in deciding
between life and death are opaque. They include terms such as "aggravating circumstances" and "mitigating circumstances" that are unfamiliar or, worse yet, have different meanings in everyday discourse
than they do in law (Haney & Lynch, 1994, 1997). In addition, many
juries have difficulty understanding the rules for balancing aggravating and mitigating factors to reach a decision - what they should do
if they find that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, that
mitigating factors outweigh aggravating, or that they are equally
strong; and whether they must agree unanimously that an aggravating
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or mitigating factor is present. Haney and Lynch (1997) found that
41 % of jurors incorrectly believed that if the mitigating factors equaled
the aggravating factors, they could still vote for death, and 27%
believed that they could vote for death even if the mitigating factors
outweighed the aggravating factors. More alarming, 41 % of the jurors
they studied thought that when the aggravating factors outweighed
the mitigating factors the law required them to vote for death. This
is not true. The law never requires a jury to vote for death, but apparently jurors believe that it does.
The Supreme Court has been remarkably oblivious to the research
on this issue, basically subscribing to the legal fiction that if the jury
is given the legally correct instructions, the jury understands the law.
The case of Weeks v. Angelone (2000) is a vivid example. In that case
the prosecutor argued that there were two applicable aggregating circumstances: that Weeks would "constitute a continuing serious threat
to society," and that his crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible, or inhumane ... " The jury was instructed: "If you find from
the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, either of the two alternatives, and as to that alternative you are
unanimous, then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at
death; or, if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty
is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at
life imprisonment" ( Weeks, 2000, p. 229). The jury had a written copy
of the instructions, but apparently had trouble figuring out what they
meant. After deliberating for 4½ hours, they asked the judge: "If we
believe that Lonnie Weeks Jr., is guilty of at least one of the alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty? Or must
we decide ( even though he is guilty of one of the alternatives) whether
or not to issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? What
is the Rule? Please clarify" (p. 241 ).
The judge could have answered the question by saying: "You are
not required to give the death penalty even if you find one of the
aggravating circumstances; it is up to you to decide between life and
death." Instead he simply referred them to the paragraph in the
instructions describing their choices, the very paragraph they said they
did not understand. The jury, in tears, sentenced Weeks to death.
Weeks appealed on the grounds that the jury had not understood that
a life sentence was permissible. In this case, as in others ( e.g., Buchanan
v. Angelone, 1998) the consensus of the social science research was
shared by the jurors themselves. They did not understand the instructions; they knew it; they said so; they asked for help - and they did
not get any.
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The Supreme Court was not impressed. The majority held that "A
jury is presumed to follow the instructions [ citations omitted]. Similarly, a jury is presumed to understand a judge's answers to its questions" (p. 234 ). No social science research was mentioned. Did the
Court really believe that the jury understood the judge's answer? Or
did it maintain the legal fiction of understanding, because the problem
of juror misunderstanding was surely not unique to Weeks's case but
had troublesome implications for many other capital and noncapital
cases? Either way, it is clear that unintelligible instructions are no
safeguard against arbitrary decisions.
An empirical study of people's understanding of capital jury instructions was presented to a federal trial court in the case of United States
ex rel Free v. McGinnis (1993). The judge held that the instructions
failed to provide jurors with a "clear understanding of how they are
to go about deciding whether the defendant lives or dies" (p. 1129).
The study, conducted by Hans Zeisel (described in Diamond & Levi,
1996 ), tested prospective jurors in a Chicago courthouse with 16
questions about the legal instructions for weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors, and found that a majority of the respondents gave
the correct answer on only three of the questions. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated Free's death sentence.
However, unlike most courts, which simply affirm the legal presumption that jurors understand and follow the instructions, Judge Posner,
writing for the majority in Free, said that empirical evidence that jurors
misunderstand the instructions on capital sentencing could be grounds
for a constitutional reversal. The data from Zeisel's study, however,
were not persuasive, primarily because Zeisel had not shown that any
alternative, rewritten instructions would have been more comprehensible to the jurors. A concurring judge also faulted the study for not
including jury deliberations. In response, Diamond and Levi ( 1996)
conducted a follow-up study in which they found that: ( 1) rewritten
instructions were understood significantly better than the Illinois
pattern instructions; and (2) deliberation generally did not increase
the jurors' ability to understand the instructions.
Diamond and Levi's data were not available to the Court when they
reinstated Free's death sentence, and Free was executed in 1995. But
the court's opinion in Free is an unusual and encouraging departure
from the common judicial practice of altogether ignoring empirical
data on juries' ability to understand the legal instructions. No matter
how well crafted a set of guidelines might be in theory, if the jury
cannot understand them, then in practice life or death decisions will
be arbitrary.
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Predicting dangerousness
So far we have been discussing the instructions governing the process
by which jurors are to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors in
deciding between life and death. There are also problems with the
factors themselves. Most states give jurors a list of aggravating factors
and instruct them that they must find that one or more were present
in order for the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty. Some
of the factors are straightforward and unproblematic: for example, that
the victim was a police officer. Many states include at least one factor
that seems to allow the same unbridled discretion that was held unconstitutional in Furman ( 1972 ), allowing the jury to consider whether
the murder was heinous, outrageous, wantonly cruel, vile, or depraved.
Social science has generally had little to say about the validity of these
specific factors, except for one. In several states the jury is asked to
consider whether the defendant is likely to be a continuing threat to
society, to commit violent crimes in the future. If so, the death penalty
is warranted. The constitutionality of this factor was considered in the
case of Barefoot v. Estelle ( 1983 ), in which the American Psychiatric
Association filed a brief as a Friend of the Court. The APA pointed to
a strong consensus among social scientists that not even experts can
predict future dangerousness with any accuracy, and argued that future
dangerousness should not be permissible as an aggravating factor
because it was impossible to predict, and that expert psychological
testimony of future dangerousness should be prohibited, because the
data indicated that such predictions were usually wrong. In other
words, the APA argued that its own members could not be trusted on
this issue.
Nonetheless the Supreme Court held that the factor was constitutionally acceptable, and that expert psychologists and psychiatrists
should be allowed to testify and to predict whether or not the defendant would pose a continuing threat to society. Astonishingly, the
majority found the psychiatric evidence satisfactory because "Neither
petitioner nor the [American Psychiatric Association] suggest that
psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to the future dangerousness,
only most of the time" (Barefoot v. Estelle, 1983, p. 901; emphasis
added). 1 In Barefoot the court accepted a form of social science "evidence" that was strongly repudiated by the scientific community. The
1
Of course, if predictions of dangerousness were "always wrong" they would be a
perfect (negative) predictor of future behavior - which would be a strong argument
for admitting them.
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"common sense" of the Justices seems to be that predicting the
violent potential of capital defendants is sufficiently important for
capital sentencing that if a legislature wants juries to do it, they must
be allowed to, even when the acknowledged experts on the issue say
it cannot be done.
A more cynical view is that drawing jurors' attention to future dangerousness is one of the most effective methods of getting them to
return a verdict of death. Research suggests that one of the strongest
justifications for the death penalty in the minds of the public in general
and of capital jurors in particular is that it guarantees that the defendant will never kill again (Bowers & Steiner, 1999; Eisenberg & Wells,
1993; Gross, 1998). The "common knowledge" of prosecutors,
courts, and legislatures is consistent with this research, and because
they favor death sentences, they may want to reinforce the image of
the dangerous killer out on the streets and eager to kill again. Unfortunately, this strategy is fundamentally misleading. In almost every
state a capital defendant who is sentenced to life imprisonment is
ineligible for parole, will die in prison, and is no danger to private
citizens. But sometimes this information is kept from the jury, leaving
them to believe that ifhe is not executed the murderer will be released
- perhaps in 20 years, perhaps in 10, maybe sooner (Bowers & Steiner,
1999; Eisenberg & Wells, 199 3). In Simmons v. South Carolina ( 1994)
the Supreme Court held that when a capital defendant's "future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's release
on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed
that the defendant is parole ineligible" (p. 154 ). South Carolina
attempted to evade this rule in a subsequent case ( Kelly v. South
Carolina, 2002 ), arguing that their evidence that Kelly was a "butcher"
was relevant to character, not to dangerousness, but lost again in the
Supreme Court. Judges seem to understand that evidence of future
dangerousness is powerfully persuasive to juries, but although the
Supreme Court has attempted to limit the influence of future dangerousness in cases in which it is fundamentally misleading, it has
not reconsidered its position on the overall appropriateness of such
evidence.

Racial discrimination
Broad, vague legal standards and juror misunderstanding of the law
not only lead to decisions that are arbitrary, but also provide an opportunity for racial prejudice. As early as the mid-1960s, Marvin Wolfgang
conducted a study that showed that across the South death sentences
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for rape were about 18 times more likely when the defendant was Black
and the victim was White than in other racial combinations (Maxwell
v. Bishop, 1970; Wolfgang & Reidel 1973). Uneasiness about racial
discrimination has haunted the death penalty ever since. For the most
part it has lurked in the background, appearing in concurring and
dissenting opinions, but never squarely addressed - until the case of
McCleskey v. Kemp in 1987. The issue in McCleskeywas discrimination
in the entire process that led to death sentences - not just jury discrimination, but discrimination in the decisions to arrest, to go forward
with the prosecution, and to try the case as a capital case.
By 1987 several studies had examined whether the new guided
discretion statutes enacted after Gregg had managed to eliminate racial
discrimination in capital sentencing. All showed that defendants who
killed White victims were much more likely to receive the death penalty
than those who killed Black victims. There was some evidence that
Black defendants were more likely to be sentenced to death than White
defendants, but it is less powerful and less consistent, and the effect
often disappears when the studies control for legitimate aggravating
factors such as killing a stranger or committing the murder in the
course of another felony. The race of the victim, however, showed up
as an independent factor even in the best-controlled studies. Regardless of other factors, killing a White person is more likely to result in
a death sentence than killing a Black person.
McCleskey was a Georgia case, and the centerpiece of the case was
a comprehensive landmark study of Georgia's homicide prosecutions
(Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth, 1983). In this study David Baldus
and his colleagues analyzed data on more than 400 variables in over
1,000 Georgia homicide cases and found that nothing but race could
explain the discrimination against defendants who killed White victims.
The study also found that Blacks who killed Whites were more likely
to be sentenced to death than Whites who killed Whites in some
subsets of the cases. Similar patterns were found in less comprehensive
studies in Florida (Radelet, 1981; Radelet & Pierce, 1985), South
Carolina (Jacoby & Paternoster, 1982), and eight other states (Gross
& Mauro, 1984), and in many studies across the country in the years
since McCleskey.
The Supreme Court rejected the claim of discrimination in
McCleskey by 5 to 4, with Justice Powell writing for the majority. Powell
begins by assuming the accuracy of Baldus's findings, but, all the same,
goes on to say that: "At most the Baldus study indicates a disparity that
appears to correlate with race" (McCleskey, 1987, p. 312), and "we
decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious" (p. 313). In
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fact, Baldus and his colleagues had found a powerful correlation between
capital sentencing and race of victim that could not be explained by any
combination of other variables that they considered, or that was offered
by any other researcher or interested party. Powell's central argument,
however, is that - at least in this context2 - statistical evidence is inherently "insufficient to support an inference that any of the [individual]
decisionmak.ers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory purpose"
(p. 297). That holding created an essentially insuperable barrier to
proof of racial discrimination in capital sentencing.
Years later, after he had retired, Justice Powell told his biographer
that his decision in McCleskey was the only one in his career that he
truly regretted, that his understanding of statistics "ranges from limited
to zero," and that he had come to believe that the death penalty ought
to be abolished (Jeffries, 1994, p. 451). Given the importance of the
issue of racial discrimination, abolition would have been a likely consequence if the Court had sided with McCleskey. In 1987 this was
not an acceptable outcome to Justice Powell or his colleagues in the
majority on the Supreme Court.

Death qualification
Death qualification is the practice of excluding all citizens who adamantly oppose the death penalty from serving as jurors in capital cases.
Thus in capital cases, unlike all other cases, the jury is made up exclu sively of people who would be willing to sentence a person to death.
The empirical question is whether such a "death-qualified" jury is
more than usually likely to decide that the defendant is guilty.
As with race bias, the common knowledge of prosecutors and
judges is that the answer is yes. Jurors who favor the death penalty
tend to favor the arguments of the prosecution, and prosecutors have
admitted to using death qualification in order to increase the likelihood of conviction (Oberer, 1961). As with race bias, the empirical
data coincide perfectly with legal intuition: Death-qualified jurors are
more favorable to the prosecution and more likely to vote for guilt
than the citizens who are excluded from capital juries. Conceptually,
this creates a problem of discrimination of a different sort than the

2

In other contexts, such as discrimination in employment in and in the composition
of juries, the Court has accepted statistical evidence as proof of discrimination (Gross
& Mauro, 1989, pp. 173-191.)
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one we have just considered. The issue is not discrimination between
different categories of capital defendants, but against capital defendants by comparison to other criminal defendants.
In 1968, when the issue first came before the Supreme Court
( Witherspoon v. Illinois), there was little research, and the Court held
that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that death-qualified
juries were biased towards conviction. However, the Court acknowledged that the question was an empirical one, and that they might
be persuaded in the future by a stronger empirical record. By the time
the issue came back to the Supreme Court in 1986, in the case Lockhart v McCree, the evidence consisted of 15 empirical studies, conducted over a 30-year period, using samples from different regions
and demographic groups, and multiple methods: attitude, surveys,
simulations, and interviews with actual jurors. All of the research
converged on the conclusion that death-qualified jurors were more
favorable to the prosecution and more likely to vote guilty than
the citizens who were excluded, and that jury deliberation did not
erase the bias ( Ellsworth, 1988 ). As in McCleskey, the Court was faced
with a substantial, consistent, and highly persuasive body of research
that pointed to a conclusion opposite to the one the majority wanted
to reach.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, first criticized the
research, and then declared that even if the studies proved what they
claimed, death qualification would still be constitutional. The critique
was fairly extensive. Rehnquist examined the 15 studies one by one,
finding a flaw in each and discarding it from the set, until only one
study was left ( Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, 1984) - and "Surely,"
he concluded, "a constitutional decision should not be based on a lone
study" (Lockhart, 1986, p. 173). Although the APA amicus brief, the
lower court cases, and Justice Marshall's dissent clearly described the
concept of convergent validity, the majority managed to overlook it.
As in McCleskey, the majority opinion also rejected McCree's claim
because he had failed to demonstrate that the particular jury that had
tried him included jurors who were biased towards guilt. Rehnquist's
general position is that if a jury contains 12 impartial individuals, it is
an impartial jury, even iflarge segments of the population are excluded
from serving. In effect, the Court decided that the constitutionality of
death-qualification was not an empirical question not all, despite the
holding in Witherspoon: "We do not ultimately base our decision today
on the invalidity of the lower courts' 'factual' findings" (Lockhart,
1986, p. 1762, n.3). In capital cases it is constitutional to decide guilt
or innocence with juries that are biased toward guilt.
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Conclusion: Retribution, Innocence,
and Public Opinion
In Lockhart v McCree ( 1986) the Court held that empirical research
was not relevant to the constitutionality of death qualification. In
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) the Court held that statistical data could
not prove race discrimination in capital sentencing. Many people members of the public and members of the judiciary - question
whether empirical research is relevant to the constitutionality of capital
punishment at all. For many supporters and opponents of the death
penalty the issue is a moral one, not an empirical one. Supporters
believe that death is appropriate as a form of retribution: just punishment for heinous murderers, a life for a life (Ellsworth & Gross, 1994).
Opponents believe just as strongly that it is morally wrong for the
State to kill. The empirical research we have reviewed in this chapter
has been evaluated in the contexts of these moral principles. Over the
past 35 years - the period when the constitutionality of various aspects
of the death penalty has been at issue - moral beliets about the death
penalty have been intense and passionate. The Supreme Court of
course was aware of the public's fervent support for the death penalty
during most of this period, support that was compatible with the
Court majority's own ideological commitment to the constitutionality
of capital punishment. In this context, dealing with the empirical data
on public opinion and evolving standards of decency was smooth
sailing: The public favored the death penalty, the Court favored it,
and the Court's decisions matched the data.
On the other issues, the empirical research revealed serious problems in the actual practice of capital punishment in America, in particular the continuing existence of the arbitrariness and discrimination
that were supposedly eliminated by the guided discretion standards
endorsed in Greggv. Georgia (1976). Challenges to the death penalty
have relied heavily on social science data, and the empirical arguments
have been exceptionally sophisticated and thorough, particularly on
the issues of racial discrimination and death qualification. The Court's
attempts to evade research with implications that they did not like has
contributed to what Gross and Mauro (1989) called "an expanding
swamp of uncertain rules and confusing opinions" (p. 7).
This is not a matter of judicial "common knowledge", but of values
and ideology. Most lawyers and judges know that death-qualification
produces juries that favor the prosecution, and that the criminal justice
system is not color-blind. Nor is it a matter of a general reluctance to
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consider social science data. In other contexts involving race, such as
employment, education, and the use of peremptory challenges, the
Court has found discrimination based on weaker data than those presented in McCleskey. In other cases involving the fairness of the jury,
such as the cases on jury size, they have relied on weaker evidence than
that presented in Lockhart. They have generally avoided considering
the research that shows that juries do not understand the legal standards for sentencing a person to death, but have allowed the jury to
hear inaccurate and misleading expert testimony on future dangerousness. The Court's use of social science evidence is related less to its
compatibility with scientific standards than to its compatibility with a
decision already reached. The death penalty is morally justified, and
data that threaten this premise are circumvented.
There is a growing uneasiness, however. The moral principle of just
retribution only makes sense if the people we are executing are heinous
murderers - sane, intellectually competent people who choose evil
over good. Doubts that our system of capital punishment has been
effective in singling out these morally depraved killers are reflected in
the recent Supreme Court decisions outlawing the execution of mentally retarded defendants and juveniles.
In the past decade, however, a much more important challenge has
emerged. Until recently, most people believed that the safeguards built
into our system of capital punishment - trial by jury, a seemingly
endless series of appeals, executive clemency - were so complete that
the possibility of executing someone by mistake was negligible. If
anything, people believed that these protections, particularly the appellate process, were greater than necessary and should be curtailed. The
near infallibility of the system was common knowledge. That view has
fundamentally changed.
Between 1973 and January 2007, 122 convicted capital defendants
have been exonerated and released from death row in the United States
(Death Penalty Information Center). In 2006 new investigations produced strong evidence that several executed defendants were innocent
(Shaw, 2006 ). In addition, hundreds of innocent noncapital defendants have been released in the past two decades, mostly rape defendants who were cleared by DNA evidence (Gross, Jacoby, Matheson,
Montgomery, & Patil, 2005 ). The problem of false convictions in
general - and false capital convictions in particular - has received widespread attention in the news media, and has been the subject of many
popular books, television shows, and movies. It has generated a growing
movement to reform police investigative procedures. It led to a moratorium on executions in Illinois in 1999, and a more recent one in
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New Jersey in 2006. It is the most important development in the
American criminal justice system in the past 25 years.
The Supreme Court might someday consider a direct challenge to
the death penalty on the grounds that it leads to executions of innocent people. One lower court did hold the death unconstitutional on
that basis, but it was reversed on appeal ( United States v. Quinones,
2002). More likely the issue will affect the Court indirectly.
Concerns about the execution of innocent people have already
weakened public support for capital punishment. This is the engine
that drove down support in the late 1990s. Most Americans already
believe, abstractly, that innocent defendants have been put to death
in recent years (Gross & Ellsworth, 2003). If specific false executions
are proven by DNA, or other incontrovertible evidence, support will
drop further. If the public comes to oppose the death penalty, legislatures and courts will follow suit, as they did in the case of the execution of the mentally retarded. The "evolving standards of decency"
standard puts public acceptance at the center of the constitutional
debate over capital punishment. For years the public enthusiastically
accepted capital punishment, and the Supreme Court's decisions were
consistently pro-death penalty; recently, public support has weakened,
and the Court has ruled against the death penalty for particular kinds
of defendants. In the future, if a majority of the American public comes
to oppose the death penalty altogether, it will be history.
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